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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 11-1672 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
VALERIE MANZELLA, 
 
         Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-05-cr-00289-001) 
Honorable Nora B. Fischer, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 24, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  HARDIMAN, VANASKIE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: August 29, 2011) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter comes on before this Court on defendant Valerie Manzella’s appeal 
from the District Court’s judgment dated March 3, 2011, revoking her term of supervised 
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release and sentencing her to a 12-month and one day custodial term, but without 
provision for supervised release to follow the custodial term.  We will affirm. 
Manzella initially pled guilty to one count of “Uttering a Counterfeit Security of 
an Organization Involved in Interstate Commerce” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a).  
The District Court sentenced her to 30 months imprisonment for this offense, a term well 
in excess of the advisory sentencing guidelines range of 2-8 months, to be followed by a 
three-year term of supervised release.  The Court imposed this long sentence because it 
believed that the sentence was necessary for Manzella to be eligible for a 500-hour drug 
treatment program that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) offered.  Manzella nevertheless 
appealed and her appeal was successful as we vacated her sentence and remanded the 
case to the District Court for resentencing.  See United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152 
(3d Cir. 2007).  On remand,  Manzella requested that the District Court delay 
resentencing her pending completion of the drug treatment program.  The Court 
accommodated her request and, after Manzella completed the program, it sentenced her 
to time served, which equated to approximately 13 months imprisonment.  On the 
resentencing, however, it imposed the other conditions of her initial sentence, including 
the three-year term of supervised release.  Manzella did not appeal from the new 
sentence. 
 Shortly before the expiration of Manzella’s three-year term of supervised release 
the United States Probation Department (Probation) filed a Petition on Supervised 
Release (revocation petition) alleging that Manzella had committed the following acts 
that were violations of the conditions of her supervised release: 
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On January 31, 2010, Ms. Manzella was arrested on charges 
of Theft By Unlawful Taking, Receiving Stolen Property, and 
Access Device Fraud.  The charges were all held for Court at 
the preliminary hearing. 
 
. . . 
 
On March 28, 2010, Ms. Manzella was charged with 
Prohibited Acts - Use/Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. On 
May 20, 2010, this charge was withdrawn and she entered a 
guilty plea for Disorderly Conduct.  According to the criminal 
complaint, Ms. Manzella was in possession of two crack 
pipes and a spoon with white residue. 
 
. . .  
 
Ms. Manzella failed to report to the office for scheduled 
office visits on April 13, 2010 and May 14, 2010. 
 
. . . 
 
Ms. Manzella failed to report for scheduled drug testing on 
May 7, 2010, and July 12, 2010.  Furthermore, Ms. Manzella 
tested positive for cocaine on July 14, 2010. 
 
. . .  
 
Ms. Manzella failed to notify the Probation Officer, as 
required, within 72 hours of being arrested or questioned by a 
law enforcement officer on more than one occasion.  Ms. 
Manzella was arrested on January 31, 2010, and March 28, 
2010, but did not report this law enforcement contact to the 
Probation Officer until confronted by the Probation Officer 
on later dates. 
 
Ms. Manzella was cited with a summary traffic violation on 
May 30, 2010, was questioned over the phone by a law 
enforcement officer on May 30, 2010 regarding a Burglary 
investigation, and had contact with a law enforcement officer 
on June 7, 2010, at the police station relative to the 
aforementioned burglary investigation and failed to report any 
contact with law enforcement to the Probation Officer as 
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required until confronted by the Probation Officer on later 
dates. 
 
App. at 46-47.  Five days later, Probation filed a Supplemental Petition on supervised 
Release alleging that: 
On July 27, 2010, Ms. Manzella reported to the U.S. 
Probation Office to submit a drug test.  During the drug 
testing process, a U.S. Probation Officer noticed that the 
defendant was attempting to circumvent urine testing 
procedures.  The apparatus was confiscated and is currently in 
the Possession of the U.S. Probation Office. 
 
Ms. Manzella subsequently admitted to using Cocaine a few 
days prior to the aforementioned testing date. 
 
App. at 49.1
 On the proceedings on Probation’s petition Manzella admitted the charges of all of 
the violations of supervised release alleged in the revocation petition except for the 
charge that she committed a Pennsylvania state offense when she was arrested on January 
31, 2010, and charged with theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and 
access device fraud.  Prior to the revocation hearing, it was established that Manzella’s 
violations of supervised release relating to drug possession, use, and testing, had 
stemmed from an incident in which Manzella was the victim of a violent sexual assault 
and suffered injuries including a fractured clavicle.  Following the sexual assault, 
Manzella began to suffer from symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
 
                                              
1 Manzella apparently was arrested for burglary on August 24, 2010, but that arrest was 
after her period of supervised release had ended, and so it is not relevant to this appeal.  
According to testimony at the revocation hearing, she pled guilty to a lesser charge of 
criminal trespass and was sentenced to a nine-month term of probation. 
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was subject to pressure from people in her neighborhood to drop the criminal charges 
against her attacker.  Understandably, but nevertheless not justifiably, these 
circumstances led to her drug relapse.  After her attacker pleaded guilty, Manzella was 
diagnosed with PTSD and received additional treatment for her drug addiction.  She 
completed a 28-day inpatient drug treatment program, began intensive outpatient therapy, 
started seeing a therapist twice a week, and initiated a practice of attending Narcotics 
Anonymous meetings on an almost-daily basis.  Since that time, Manzella has not tested 
positive for drugs,2
 At Manzella’s revocation hearing the Government introduced into evidence, 
without objection, police reports detailing the case against her which had resulted in the 
state charges of theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and access device 
fraud.  The police reports noted that an individual had called police to report that one of 
his debit cards was missing after he had been with Manzella and that when the individual 
contacted his bank he learned that his card had been used to make more than $400 of 
purchases.  The individual subsequently presented a detective with his bank statements 
showing that his card had been used for transactions within an hour of each other at two 
Giant Eagle stores.  The detective notified the head of loss prevention at Giant Eagle’s 
corporate office and Giant Eagle provided him with a surveillance tape of the registers for 
each purchase which showed several video angles of the same female leaving the store in 
 and she received a job offer shortly before her revocation hearing.     
                                              
2 Manzella volunteered to continue drug tests during the period after her term of 
supervised release expired, but before her revocation hearing took place.  During that 
time she took 17 tests, all of which came back negative, although five of those tests were 
deemed invalid because of high creatinine levels. 
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all of the videos.  The detective showed the victim pictures of the female and he 
identified her as Manzella, an identification which led to Manzella’s arrest.   
At the revocation hearing on Probation’s petition Manzella introduced into 
evidence a February 11, 2011 Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas Rule 586 Order 
of Court dismissing the state charges involving her use of the debit card in exchange for 
Manzella agreeing to pay restitution in the amount of $304.82 to the victim.  There was 
additional evidence at the hearing of Manzella’s wrongful use of the debit card as 
Probation Officer Tara Kessler testified that Manzella admitted “the victim had given her 
permission to charge a certain amount on the card but that she spent more than what he 
had said and that’s why he filed the charges[,]” and that the amount of restitution that 
Manzella agreed to repay to the victim was over $300.  App. at 135-36. 
 After the close of evidence, at the point at which the District Court was stating its 
findings of fact and preparing to pronounce its judgment, Manzella objected to its 
consideration of the police reports.  The Court nevertheless found that Manzella had 
committed a crime under Pennsylvania law, and, in noting Manzella’s late objection, 
stated that “there’s corroborating evidence . . . that leads me to believe that there’s a 
sufficient basis here under the preponderance of the evidence standard and given the rules 
that are applicable to a revocation proceeding, that the Court’s ruling stands.”  App. at 
223.  The Court determined that Manzella had committed a Grade B violation of 
supervised release, which subjected her to an advisory sentencing range of 12 to 18 
months imprisonment.  On March 3, 2011, the Court entered its judgment revoking 
7 
 
Manzella’s supervised release and sentencing her to a custodial term of 12 months and 
one day.    
Manzella filed a timely notice of appeal and an unopposed motion for expedition 
of the appeal which we granted on March 15, 2011.  Manzella challenges both the 
District Court’s judgment and her sentence in this appeal. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  A district court must find, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated a condition of supervised 
release before it can revoke a defendant’s supervised release.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).  
We review a district court’s decision to revoke supervised release for an abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review a 
district court’s factual findings supporting a decision to revoke supervised release for 
clear error and exercise de novo review over questions of law that arise in a decision to 
revoke supervised release.  Id.  We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness 
of a district court’s sentence for supervised release violations for an abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 237 (3d. Cir 2011).  
 
III. DISCUSSION 
Manzella’s primary argument on appeal is that the District Court erred in 
considering police reports regarding her alleged theft during the revocation hearing, as 
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she contends that those reports contained inadmissible hearsay and the Court violated her 
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses by relying on the reports.  There is, 
however, an obvious problem with the argument because when the District Court asked 
Manzella’s attorney whether she had objected to the admission of the police reports into 
evidence, she responded “No Objection[.]”  App. at 135.  Moreover, on at least two 
occasions in the revocation proceedings after the admission of the reports when 
Manzella’s attorney had an opportunity to object to the use of the reports she did not do 
so.  See app. at 183, 206.  Thus, although Manzella could have objected to the reports 
earlier she did not object to them until after the District Court already had set forth factual 
findings and was preparing to pronounce its judgment.  Furthermore, even then she  
objected only on hearsay grounds.  See app. at 217.  Therefore, though Manzella argues 
on appeal that she was denied her right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
she did not assert in the District Court that she had any such right until the Court had 
rendered its judgment.  See app. at 222. 
Because Manzella’s objection to the use of the police reports was untimely, we 
will review her claims challenging the consideration of those reports under the plain error 
standard.   Consequently, we have the discretion to reverse the District Court’s judgment 
only if the admission of the reports affected her “substantial rights.”  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(b).  To constitute plain error, there must have been an obvious legal error, and, in the 
circumstances of this case, Manzella has the burden of persuasion that the error was 
prejudicial; that is, that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.  See United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777-78 (1993).  The Supreme 
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Court has “explained that the discretion conferred by Rule 52(b) should be employed in 
those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”  Id. at 736, 
113 S.Ct. at 1779 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
  It is axiomatic that “a defendant charged with violating a release condition, unlike 
a defendant charged with violating a statute, does not enjoy ‘the full panoply of rights’ 
normally available in a criminal proceeding.”  United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 260 
(3d Cir. 2001).  Thus, in revocation hearings the defendant does not have a right to trial 
by jury and the government must prove the charge of violation of supervised release only 
by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by satisfying a more exacting standard.  
The Supreme Court has explained that revocation hearings “should be flexible enough to 
consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be 
admissible in an adversary criminal trial.”  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 
S.Ct. 2593, 2604 (1972).  And, while defendants in revocation hearings have a general 
right to question adverse witnesses, that right is not absolute, as it does not apply if “the 
court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear[.]”  
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C).  In determining whether the interest of justice requires a 
witness to appear, we have held “that a district court ‘should apply a balancing test [in 
revocation hearings] when considering the releasee’s asserted right to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses,’ and that ‘[t]he court is to balance the person’s interest in the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to confrontation against the government's good cause for 
denying it.’”  United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) advisory committee’s note).    
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 Here, as we previously discussed, Manzella did not object to the police reports 
until after the close of evidence when the District Court was preparing to pronounce its 
judgment, at which point Manzella objected on hearsay grounds.  And, it was not until 
after the Court concluded “that the facts are sufficient under a preponderance of evidence 
standpoint to have me make the determination [that] there was a commission of a . . . 
state crime in this case[,]” app. at 221, that Manzella made any objection to the police 
reports on confrontation grounds.  The late objections prevented the Court from 
conducting a balancing test with respect to witnesses appearing, and determining, at a 
point in the revocation hearing when it was still possible to call potential witnesses who 
could have testified to the information in the reports, whether “the interest of justice . . . 
required the witness to appear[.]”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C).   
 We do not know why Manzella delayed making her objection to the reports but, 
regardless of the reason for her delay, we do not view the District Court’s consideration 
of the reports as having affected her substantial rights.  Rather, when we consider all of 
the evidence we conclude that Manzella has not met her burden of establishing that even 
if there was an error in the District Court proceedings the error was prejudicial to the 
extent that it affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings.  In this regard, we 
observe that the evidence at the revocation hearing included, besides the police reports, 
which were supported by video evidence obtained from the Giant Eagle stores, direct 
testimony, which the District Court found credible and that Manzella did not dispute or 
rebut, that Manzella admitted that “the victim had given her permission to charge a 
certain amount on the card but that she spent more than what he had said and that’s why 
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he filed the charges[,]” and that the amount of restitution that Manzella agreed to repay to 
the victim was over $300.  App. at 135-36.  Thus, even if we ignore the police reports, 
there was a preponderance of evidence establishing that Manzella committed a state 
offense as charged in the revocation petition.  Accordingly, there was not a “miscarriage 
of justice” in the District Court proceedings in this case calling for us to exercise our 
discretion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) to reverse the Court’s 
judgment.  See Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. at 1779. 
 Manzella also argues that the District Court erred, “by relying on a Pennsylvania 
Rule 586 order of court dismissing state criminal charges as evidence of guilt of the 
underlying charges.”  Appellant’s br. at 44.  She relies primarily for this contention on 
our decision in United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 570 (3d Cir. 2004), in which we 
held that the district court’s consideration of a defendant’s nolo contendere plea to a state 
crime “as evidence of [the defendant’s] commission of the underlying crime was 
improper.”  On remanding that case to the district court, we directed that, applying the 
preponderance of evidence standard, “the District Court should take into account all 
evidence in the record, including, but not limited to, evidence presented at [the 
defendant’s] plea hearing”, and clarified that “[w]hat the District Court may not do . . . is 
treat the nolo plea as an admission by [the defendant] that he committed the crime.”  Id.  
Here, we disagree with Manzella’s assertion that the District Court considered her 
dismissal of the state charges under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 586 as 
evidence of her guilt of those charges.  Rather, the Court followed our directions in 
Poellnitz to consider the Rule 586 dismissal in the context of the entirety of the evidence.  
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In fact, the Court specifically discussed the import of our decision in Poellnitz, properly 
applied it to the facts of this case, and concluded that the evidence was sufficient to find 
that Manzella had committed a state crime.  We therefore find no error with respect to 
this issue. 
Manzella’s penultimate claim is that even considering the police reports and Rule 
586 dismissal, the evidence was not sufficient to establish that she committed a state 
crime by preponderance of the evidence.  She also argues that even if there was sufficient 
evidence to establish that she committed a state crime, that crime was not punishable by a 
term of imprisonment exceeding one year, and, therefore, did not constitute a Grade B 
violation of supervised release.  See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2) (codifying that conduct 
“constituting any other federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of 
imprisonment exceeding one year” is a Grade B violation).   
Manzella claims that there was insufficient evidence for the District Court to 
conclude that she had the requisite intent to commit any of the three state offenses with 
which she was charged—theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and access 
device fraud—by a preponderance of the evidence.  We disagree with that assertion.  
Testimony at the revocation hearing established that Manzella admitted that she had used 
the victim’s debit card at the Giant Eagle stores, charged more than she had been 
authorized to spend, and agreed to pay restitution to the victim in excess of $300.  That 
uncontradicted evidence was sufficient for the Court to conclude by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Manzella had the requisite intent to deprive the victim of his property 
and knowledge that the property was stolen.   
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Manzella’s arguments that the government did not offer any direct proof that the 
overcharge was not accidental or that she did not intend to repay the victim for the 
overcharge are unavailing.  Because “[d]irect evidence of a defendant’s mental state 
frequently is unavailable,” a fact-finder “is entitled to scrutinize and make reasonable 
inferences from defendant’s conduct and from all facts surrounding the incident in 
question.”  United States v. Peters, 462 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  That is particularly true when the question is one of an 
individual’s intent, as “[i]ntent frequently cannot be proven except by circumstantial 
evidence; the determination [of intent] often depends on the credibility of witnesses, as 
assessed by the factfinder.”  United States v. Phythian, 529 F.3d 807, 812 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(alteration in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  We are satisfied that the 
District Court properly considered the entirety of the evidence, and that sufficient 
evidence in the record supported its factual findings and legal conclusions.  If Manzella 
wished to demonstrate that her overcharge was accidental or that she intended from the 
outset to reimburse the victim, she should have presented some evidence supporting those 
assertions to the District Court instead of relying on mere suggestions to that effect which 
she does not support by any evidence to which she cites in her appellate brief.   
Likewise, the evidence was sufficient to establish that she committed a Grade B 
violation of supervised release.  Conduct constituting a state offense punishable by more 
than one year in prison is a grade B violation.  See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).  Under 
Pennsylvania law, second degree misdemeanors and higher are punishable by a term of 
imprisonment exceeding one year.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 106(b)(7) and (8) (West 
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1998).  Theft by unlawful taking and receiving stolen property are second-degree 
misdemeanors if the value involved is greater than $50, but less than $200, and first-
degree misdemeanors if the value involved is greater than $200.  See id. § 3903(b).  
Access device fraud is a second-degree misdemeanor even if the value involved is less 
than $50.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §4106(c)(1)(iii) (West Supp. 2006).  Testimony 
established that Manzella agreed to reimburse the victim over $300, and Manzella did not 
offer any evidence on her own behalf to suggest that the $300 figure was incorrect or 
otherwise contradict that testimony.  It was therefore reasonable for the District Court to 
rely on that amount in determining that the state offenses constituted a Grade B violation.     
Manzella’s final claim that her sentence is procedurally and substantively 
unreasonable is without merit, as, despite her protestations to the contrary, the District 
Court gave meaningful consideration to the appropriate factors under 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a), and Manzella has not met her burden of establishing that her 12-month and one-
day sentence, which was at the low end of the guideline range of 12 to 18 months, was 
unreasonable.  Overall, we are satisfied that the Court did not abuse its discretion in 
imposing Manzella’s sentence. 
Lastly, we note that Manzella’s arguments on appeal minimize the fact that she 
was charged not only with committing a state offense in the revocation petition, but that 
she was also charged with and admitted to offenses related to drug use.3
                                              
3 Although we question whether it was advisable to bring those drug-related charges in 
the revocation petition given that Manzella voluntarily extended her initial term of 
imprisonment in order to complete the BOP’s 500-hour drug treatment program, and the 
reason for her relapse was that she was the victim of a sexual assault, after which she 
  Those drug-
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related offenses subjected her to mandatory revocation of supervised release, see 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(g), and constituted Grade B violations because they were punishable by a 
term of imprisonment exceeding one year due to her having a prior drug conviction.  See 
United States v. Cates, 613 F.3d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 2010); see also 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); 
United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 2007).  Accordingly, even if we 
rejected the District Court’s ruling that Manzella committed a state offense constituting a 
Grade B violation, that rejection would not undermine the final judgment entered or 
sentence imposed by the District Court because the drug offenses, to which Manzella 
admitted, mandated revocation of her supervised release and were, themselves, Grade B 
violations.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
received additional drug treatment and remained sober once her attacker pleaded guilty, 
we recognize that the decision to bring these charges is not subject to our review.   
 
